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Williams: Enemy Reaction to Overlord

Enemy Reaction to Overlord
Allied Intelligence Assessment
6 May 1944
Editor’s Note: In the months leading up to
Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy,
Allied planners invested heavily in their
attempts to learn about German dispositions.
Much has been written about the “failure” of
the Allies to detect the German 352nd Division
which nearly doomed the American landings
at Omaha. However, this was only one small
piece of the intelligence picture. Ultra decrypts
based on German wireless messages provided
Allied planners with details of the German
Order of Battle in France though the
exact location of battalions, regiments
and divisions was not always certain.
Brigadier Bill Williams, General
Montgomery’s senior intelligence
officer, was responsible for producing
a monthly update on the “Enemy
Build-up” in Normandy together with
an estimate of the German reaction
to the invasion. This report,
stamped “BIGOT,” the highest level
of secrecy, was sent to LieutenantColonel Peter Wright, the senior
intelligence officer (GSOI) at First
Canadian Army Headquarters on
6 May 1944 for information and
comment. The letter reproduced

below is the covering letter to the report, while
the report itself follows on the next page. This
report represents the best knowledge the Allies
had of German troop dispositions and
intentions prior to the invasion. In hindsight, it
is remarkable just how perceptive, detailed and
correct this intelligence assessment turned out
to be in regards to German capabilities and
reactions to the invasion. Perhaps it is time to
concentrate on Allied successes rather than
alleged “failures.”

This is the covering letter to the
intelligence report. Brigadier
Williams added a hand-written note
stating: “This is to keep you
informed of the way we’re looking
so don’t trouble to look up from
your own work unless you notice
some glaring blob. Tonight’s Isum
[intelligence summary] gives the
Caen move. Yours ever, Bill.”
Below that, Lieutenant-Colonel
Wright initialed his acceptance,
“I agree with this. 8 May.”
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BIGOT
TOP SECRET
21 AGp/OO/INT/1101/4/15

ENEMY REACTION TO OVERLORD:
LAND FORCES
(This paper replaces those of the same reference of 28 Jan
and 15 Mar and is based on information up to 5 May)

1. GROUND VITAL TO THE ENEMY
(i) The enemy will attempt on the beaches to
prevent our landings and our build-up.
Throughout, whether in the initial counterattacks, in carefully reconnoitered and
comprehensive counterattacks or in the
subsequent attempt to rope us off, certain
commanding ground which governs nodal
centres and through-routes is essential to his
enterprise. We may expect him to hold it with
infantry in a series of firm bases forming pivots
of manoeuvre for his Panzer divisions.
(ii) The following roads (all Routes Nationales)
are essential to him:LISEUX – CAEN
FALAISE – CAEN
FLERS – CAEN
VIRE – CARENTAN
VILLEDIEU – CAEN
AVRANCHES – VALOGNES
COUNTANCES – BAYEUX
And the lateral Granville-Flers-Argentan (with
its parallel railway) beside which his main
NEPTUNE dumps are dispersed.
(iii) Following on this there nodal points are
vital:1. CAEN
2. FALAISE
3. ARGENTAN
4. THURY HARCOURT
5. VILLERS-BOCAGE
6. CAUMONT
7. BOUVIGNY
8. VIRE
9. ST LO

10. CARENTAN
11. LA HAYE DU PUTTS
12. COUTANCES
13. VILLEDIEU
(iv) To hold these the following zones are
necessary:(A) The East bank of the DIVES valley; to force
in our Eastern boundary.
(B) The high ground (with Mt. Pincon as its
peak) from North of FALAISE running in a
semicircle to St. Lo and controlling 2-9 above
(a) Through here run the routes of
reinforcement and nourishment;
(b) From this ground he will counterattack;
(c) On it he must try to stem our advance
South.
(C) The high ground from the West of the VIRE
and VILLEDIEU to ST. SAUVEUR
LENDELLIN:(a) To safeguard the valuable lateral linking
his whole front;
(b) As a firm base from which he can attack
North towards the peninsula or N.E.
towards BAYEUX;
(c) Eventually to prevent our advance South
after the peninsula has been lost.
(v) Forward of these are five vital centres which
he must prevent our capturing and which so long
as he holds them will prevent our deployment:-
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1. CAEN
2. BAYEUX
3. CARENTAN – ISIGNY
4. LA HAYE DU PUITS
5. VALOGNES
The first four would split up our assaults
and enable the enemy to tackle them in detail.
We may expect then his immediate attempt to
secure them. The fifth, VALOGNES, is the key
to CHERBOURG which would be condemned to
perimeter defence once VALOGNES had been
lost.

to meet a general threat. No substantial change
in infantry dispositions is likely since his infantry
divisions are already under command of their
respective Armies. C-in-C West will have under
his command some 60 divisions of which 10 will
be Panzer type, the rest infantry of varying quality
(some in a coastal role, some with airborne
training) but nearly all of a pace conditioned in
action by the fact that their artillery is
horsedrawn.

(i) Phase I: D-1 and the Assault on the Neptune
area

On D-Day we shall meet three coastal
divisions (709, 716 and the fringe of 711);
possibly three infantry divisions (243, 352 and
a division suspected to be S.E. of CAEN) the task
of which is probably to seal off any immediate
break in the crust; and probably 21 and 12 SS
Panzer Divisions: 8 divisions.

By D-1 the enemy, having watched our ports
fill up, is likely to have adjusted his dispositions

Early morning bombing, our airborne troops
and our naval craft all point to the NEPTUNE

2. ENEMY BUILD-UP AND LIKELY ACTION
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Prior to D-Day, Allied Intelligence predicted that two Panzer divisions could intervene on the day of the invasion, but that
as many as five additional Panzer Divisions could arrive by D+2. This photo shows a Panzer Mark IV, likely of 12th SS
Panzer Division, moving towards the beaches in the early days of the invasion.

We shall meet immediately three infantry
divisions (709, 716, 243) and it is probable that
352 Division will make for ISIGNY and BAYEUX;
the unidentified infantry division for CAEN. 12
SS Panzer Division must recce our Eastern limit
before plunging but must be expected to move
rapidly on CAEN and push on, if possible to
BAYEUX. The reports of our airborne troops
dropping across the neck of the peninsula should
force 21 Panzer Division to take the coastal route
towards LESSAY to make for LA HAYE DU
PUITS. The enemy cannot afford to have
CHERBOURG isolated. He knows we need a port
quickly.
On D day he will try
(a) to force us from the beaches; and
(b) to secure –
CAEN with 12 SS Panzer Division and
the suspected infantry division S.E. of
CAEN

LA HAYE DU PUITS with 21 Panzer
Division
The tasks of these divisions are dispersed; not
only must they plug the holes in the coastal crust
but also secure vital points meantime.
Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 162305

area. It will not be certain that this is our main
assault but it will be evident that the NEPTUNE
area is being assaulted in strength.

By evening the width of our frontage and the
approximate number of our assaulting divisions
are evident: it is a major assault.
(ii) Phase II: First Reinforcement of the
NEPTUNE area
His two nearest Panzer divisions probably
already concentrating for a move, will be
summoned. 17 SS from THOUARS (South of the
LOIRE) which may be expected to travel North
via ARGENTAN; 116 Panzer which may be
expected to leave area MANTES on the LISIEUX
route. In addition, 711 Infantry Division must
prepare to hold the East bank of the DIVES
helped to its South by 84 Infantry Division which
can move up from ROUEN. 12 SS Panzer
Division must be left free to punch. (We are
unlikely to make effective contact with 711 and
84 Infantry Divisions at this stage).
D+1 Counterattacks will continue:

BAYEUX, ISIGNY and CARENTAN with
243 and 352 Divisions
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(a) To hold onto or to regain CAEN, BAYEUX
and CARENTAN;

Mediterranean coast. Eleven divisions may begin
moving to counterattack OVERLORD:

(b) To drive a wedge between the American
landings; and

Five Panzer (from AMIENS, TOULOUISE,
BORDEAUX, (?) NANCY AND BELGIUM)

(c) To keep open the Western entrance to the
peninsula.

and six infantry (from W. BRITTANY, the PAS
DE CALAIS and Eastern FRANCE)

By evening 17 SS and 116 Panzer Divisions
can have arrived, 17 from ARGENTAN moving
either North towards CAEN or via the lateral
turning N.W. towards St. Lo; 116 coming in
initially behind 12 SS.

By D+5 though some may not yet have
arrived, the enemy is beginning to have the
necessary ingredients for a full scale
counterattack after proper recce and
deployment: with infantry holding essential
ground and 8 Panzer divisions available or nearly
ready.

(iii) Phase III: General concentration against
OVERLORD
By D+2 OVERLORD has become an
overriding menace requiring the concentration
of all available formations. FORTITUDE is
unlikely to prove a tug much longer as the shape
and weight of OVERLORD become clearer. ANVIL
remains an unreleased threat; it may pin down
one Panzer Division (9 at NIMES) to the

The full blooded counterattack is likely at
any time after D+6.
We may expect therefore the three vital zones
mentioned in para 1 (iv) above to be taken over
by infantry to leave Panzer divisions free to
operate through them in an all-out attempt to
return us into the sea. The infantry may possibly

Allied Intelligence correctly noted that much German transport was horse-drawn. The German
photo shows German troops marching to meet the Allied invasion shortly after D-Day
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be disposed as follows: 243 Division involved in
the peninsula possibly supported by 3 Parachute
Division from West Brittany if 21 Panzer Division
has managed to keep open the entrance to the
peninsula; 352 Division forward from St. Lo; and
of the remaining seven, 84 Infantry Division in
zone A supporting 12 SS and 116 Panzer
Divisions as before; four of the remainder
holding zone B; perhaps two firm in zone C.
(iv) Phase IV: More Infantry
During this counterattack which is likely to
last four to five days before a wound-licking
respite, arrangements must be made to corral
us. The remaining Panzer Division in the West
and Goering Panzer Division from Italy are likely
to be demanded. It is probable, as a first step,
that Goering Division will take over the ANVIL
responsibility by moving into Mediterranean
France to free the Panzer Division at NIMES for
the NEPTUNE area.
The crust of coastal divisions outside the
NEPTUNE area will probably remain intact but
the uncommitted inf reserve of other Armies
under C-in-C West will be sent to the NEPTUNE
area:
276, 326 and 344 Infantry, 19 German Air
Force, 157, 182 and 189 Training Divisions.
Estimated timings become increasingly
schematic but by D+25 all these divisions may
have arrived: to make the total 30, incl 10 Panzer
Divisions.

division, two from Scandinavia) will become
available. At least one should be Panzer, possibly
two.
The total may become 34, incl possibly 12
Panzer.
(v) Phase IV: The Allied advance from the
bridgehead
We come progressively into contact with
infantry divisions in BRITTANY (721, 266, 353,
343, 265 and 273 Infantry divisions) and the
total number of divisions with which we clash
may reach 40.
It is appreciated that 319 Infantry Division
in the CHANNEL ISLANDS will be left there as a
suicidal nuisance. It may, however, have been
partially evacuated earlier to reinforce
CHERBOURG; or, in this phase, attempt to make
the ports of North BRITTANY.
The growing Allied bulge towards the LOIRE
must surmount the threat of ANVIL. The enemy
will begin to sell out of the BISCAY coast, U-Boat
bases notwithstanding, and thin out dangerously
from his Mediterranean holdings. Seven infantry
divisions may thus become available (271, 272,
277, 338 and 708 Infantry Divisions with 158
and 159 Training Divisions). Further, a few
infantry divisions North of the SEINE may have
to be extracted from the coastal crust. By D+60
the enemy total build-up against OVERLORD
may rise to 50 divisions, leaving some 15 inferior
formations holding the coastline North of the
SEINE.

In this phase we shall see an alternation of
large scale counterattack and the attempt to rope
us off. Demands will have been made to Germany
for troops from other theatres and it is estimated
that four divisions (two from Italy, incl Goering

GSI
21 Army Group
6 May 1944
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